THE MURDER OF SARAJEVO

TRANSLATION OF AN ARTICLE

BY

M. LJUBA JOVANOVIĆ

PRESIDENT OF THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE PARLIAMENT

Published in

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PREFATORY NOTE

IT was natural that the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of the War, which fell in August 1924, should be the occasion for numerous articles and reminiscences. Among these none has attracted more attention than an article written by M. Ljuba Jovanović, who was Minister of Education in the Serbian Government in 1914. Many references and short quotations from this article have already appeared in the British Press. But obviously a publication of this importance cannot be properly judged merely by isolated extracts. For this reason it has been determined to include a translation of the whole for the information of members in the current number of the *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*. In order to make it accessible to those who are not members of the Institute this reprint is being published separately.

The only object of this publication is, therefore, to enable students to read for themselves a document which is written in a language known to few. To them must be left the duty of comparing it with the further evidence available regarding the events with which it deals and of drawing conclusions from it.

March, 1925.

THE MURDER OF SARAJEVO

Translation of an article entitled "After Vidov Dan, 1914," [1] *by M. Ljuba Jovanović, President of the S.C.S. Parliament, in* Krv Slovenstva (*The Blood of Slavdom*), *Belgrade*, 1924.

AT the outbreak of the World War I was Minister of Education in M. Nikola Pašić's Cabinet. I have recently written down some of my recollections and some notes on the events of those days. For the present occasion I have chosen from them a few extracts, because the time is not yet come for everything to be disclosed.

I do not remember whether it was at the end of May or the beginning of June, when one day M. Pašić said to us (he conferred on these matters more particularly with Stojan Protić, who was then Minister of the Interior; but he said this much to the rest of us) that there were people who were preparing to go to Sarajevo to kill Francis Ferdinand, who was to go there to be solemnly received on *Vidov Dan*. As they afterwards told me, the plot was hatched by a group of secretly organised persons and in patriotic Bosno-Herzegovinian student circles in Belgrade. M. Pašić and the rest of us said, and Stojan agreed, that he should issue instructions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to deny a crossing to the youths who had already set out from Belgrade for that purpose. But the frontier "authorities" themselves belonged to the organisation, and did not carry out Stojan's instructions, but reported to him (and he afterwards reported to us) that the order had reached them too late, for the young men had already got across.

Thus the endeavour of the Government to prevent the execution of the plot failed, as also did the endeavour made on his own initiative by our Minister in Vienna, M. Joca Jovanović, in an interview with the Minister Bilinski, to dissuade the Archduke from the fatal journey which he contemplated. And so the attempt at Sarajevo was to be carried out, in more terrible measure than had been anticipated, and with results which no one could then have pictured even in his wildest dreams.

[1] St. Vitus's Day, 28th June: the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo.—*Tr.*

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I was personally acquainted with Gavril Princip, the chief conspirator. I saw him two or three times in my department, when he came to me to ask me to allow him to sit privately for the examination at the Lycée; first for the fifth, and then for the sixth class. He remains in my memory: slight, broadish in the shoulders, with a broad though somewhat pinched countenance. He spoke naturally and without nervousness. I advised and encouraged him—as I did many other youths who came to Belgrade from Austria-Hungary almost like emigrants —to pursue his studies and finish his schooling, because the better his equipment the greater use would he be to the nation, and in general, the better would he serve his own ideals. I allowed him to sit for his examination on both occasions, and he sat for both in the first Lycée. The last time I saw him we parted in quite an amusing way. He came to see whether my permission for his examination was ready, and whether it had been sent to the Lycée. It often happened that young strangers like him came and pestered me about details of this kind, and I was annoyed and flew out at him and began to give him a piece of my mind. The wretched Princip first looked at me in amazement, and then immediately turned hastily to the door, stammering: "I am sorry. I did not know . . ." and made for the exit. I turned, and made to reassure him in more kindly fashion, but he was in a hurry to be off as soon as possible.

Who could then have foreseen what this same agitated young student would do a few weeks afterwards?

On the afternoon of *Vidov Dan* I was in my house on the Senjak. About five o'clock an official telephoned to me from the Press Bureau, and told me what had happened at noon at Sarajevo. Even though I knew what had been prepared there, nevertheless I felt, as I held the receiver, as though someone had dealt me an unexpected blow; and when a little later the first report was confirmed from other quarters I began to be overwhelmed with grave anxiety.

Not for a moment did I doubt that Austria-Hungary would make this the occasion for declaring war upon Serbia; and I considered that the position both of the Government and of the country in regard to other States would now become very difficult, and in every way worse than after the 29th May/11th June,[1] 1903, or during the time of our more recent disputes with Vienna and Budapest. I was afraid that all the European Courts would feel themselves individually the target of Princip's bullets, and would

[1] The date of the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga.

hold aloof from us, with the approval of the monarchist and conservative sections in their countries. And even if it did not quite come to that, who would dare to stand up in our defence? I knew that neither France nor, still less, Russia was in a position to measure herself with Germany and her allies on the Danube, because their preparations were not to be complete before 1917. It was this that more especially filled me with anxiety and fear.

The most terrible thoughts crowded in upon me. This began at five o'clock on the Sunday of *Vidov Dan*, and continued day and night, except during a few fitful moments of sleep, until Tuesday forenoon. Then my young friend, Major N—— (of the Ministry of Education), came to see me. He was uneasy, but he was not in despair as I was. I poured out my apprehensions to him without restraint or reflection. He at once said to me, in the tone usual to him on such occasions, that is to say, pleasantly and quietly, but with complete conviction: "My dear Minister, I think that it is quite unnecessary to despair. If Austria-Hungary wants to declare war on us,—well, let her! It would have had to come to that anyhow sooner or later. The present is a very inconvenient moment for us. But it is not now in our power to choose the moment. And if Austria has chosen it, well, let it be so. It may well turn out badly for us, but who knows? It may perhaps be otherwise." I was, I think, beside myself at that moment; but these words of his, I declare, quite pulled me together, and I began to recover; and, remembering what he had said to me, I little by little began to think clearly, and never afterwards was I so overcome by events as during those two days.

My chief concern now was, what echoes of the Sarajevo affair would be heard from Europe? Happily, from the Petrograd Press—and so far as it was concerned we could assume in advance that it represented the official view—we received the first favourable reports: it took up our defence against the Austro-Hungarian accusations. Russia, then, would not deny us or pass by on the other side. After Russia would come her friends. And so by degrees it turned out. In this respect we were appreciably helped by the "pogroms" against Serbs, fomented or winked at in Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia. The impartial world could now see how the Serbs, whom the Austro-Hungarian Press represented as a people whose turpitude passed all measure, were on the contrary themselves the victims of her injustice and her inhumanity.

We could now breathe a little more freely again. But Vienna also began to get to work. It is true that the representatives of the dynasty, and Court circles in general, except those few who were directly stricken, did not greatly mourn the murdered heir-apparent and his wife, and made little attempt at concealment; and even, to some extent, paraded their sentiments at his funeral in Vienna. In fact, with the disappearance of Francis Ferdinand, the Imperial House was freed from a serious domestic difficulty, and the State from a difficult and involved constitutional problem which threatened seriously to embroil the relations between the Austrian and Hungarian portions of the Monarchy and to give rise to endless internal troubles. For this reason there were, even in Belgrade, people who seriously hoped that our neighbours would, if only for form's sake, cry out a little against us, and then let the matter drop. But, not content with all these favourable consequences of the Sarajevo murder, the Austro-Hungarian rulers were evidently bent on exploiting even the event itself and on squeezing the utmost profit out of it, to the detriment of the Serbs and of Serbia, not only in their own country but also abroad. In particular, they used the greatest efforts through the Vienna Press Bureau to influence the Press at home and in Europe and, in fact, everywhere.

I was in the same way a witness of the efforts they made to use the event with the greatest profit to their internal situation, and to have the best possible excuse for repressing and even causing damage to Serbs and other similar uncertain elements in their population. In this they found ample assistance among some of the people of our own blood, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. The aim of Vienna still was to create a movement which would draw together all those diverse peoples and unrelated facts which constitute the Hapsburg Monarchy, and out of all these to form a single national soul in the face of the enemies of the Imperial House and of the State. This is what Austria-Hungary above all lacked. And what she and her friends continually and most of all feared—and we for our part hoped—was that in some great war she should be unable to appear as she appeared in 1866 in the war with Prussia and Italy. I now saw with apprehension how the rulers of our enemy were cleverly repairing this natural defect, and how they were preparing their otherwise patchwork "people" for unanimous and enthusiastic foreign action, in the first place against Serbia.

It became all the clearer to me what Austria-Hungary had

in mind for us. From her side there began to be uttered the word "war." There were many signs and events which told me that Germany stood firmly beside Austria-Hungary. I had, however, even before this, become convinced that Germany had determined not to allow Russia and France to complete their preparations for war, upon which Russia was actively working, but to anticipate them in her preparations and herself take the initiative in beginning armed hostilities. That unusual vote of extraordinary military credits to the amount of a milliard marks all pointed in this direction, as, indeed, the whole world had immediately seen. I myself had the impression in the course of the spring that Germany was beginning to look for a pretext for a quarrel with the French Government; and I was from that moment convinced that Berlin would, out of some trifle or other, manufacture a dispute in which to find occasion for a trial of arms with France and Russia, if she could not find anything more suitable elsewhere.

Princip and his friends had now provided her with such an occasion, and I therefore thought that neither Germany nor Austria would let such an opportunity slip; only that now all the fury of the first attacks would fall, not upon France or some other, but upon Serbia.

My colleagues believed, on the contrary, that war could be avoided, and they therefore decided—altogether in the spirit of the policy of our friends and ourselves—to avoid it. Such satisfaction as must be given to Austria-Hungary would be given to her, and the struggle would thus be postponed until a time when we should again be ready for a fight such as that from which we had issued with glory and great acquisitions the previous summer. The Ministers all worked with this intention. When the Austrian stories arrived from Vienna to the effect that the assassins had received directions in Sarajevo from an official of the Serbian Ministry of Public Works, a certain Milan Ciganović, M. Pašić asked M. Joca Jovanović, then in charge of that department, who this official of his was; but M. Joca knew nothing about him, nor did anybody in his department. Under pressure from M. Pašić, they at last unearthed Ciganović in some small clerical post in the railway administration. I remember that somebody (either Stojan or Pašić) said, when Joca told us this: "There, you see! It is true enough what they say: if any mother has lost her son, let her go and look for him in the railway administration." After that we heard from M. Joca that Ciganović had gone off somewhere out of Belgrade. And Stojan set on foot

some inquiries from his side. Among other things, there was found at Belgrade post office (*poste restante*) a postcard from Sarajevo which one of the conspirators had before *Vidov Dan* addressed to one of his colleagues in Belgrade.

From all this it might have been expected that Vienna would be unsuccessful in establishing any connection between official Serbia and the event on the Miljacka. M. Pašić therefore hoped that we should somehow pull ourselves through this crisis, and he made efforts, in which he was supported by all the rest of us, to preserve as far as possible the relations which we had so far established, in order that Serbia might get through as cheaply as might be with the unhappy task of giving satisfaction to Austria-Hungary, and that she might recover as quickly as possible from the blows which in such a case were bound in any event to fall upon her.

It is recognised that the Government did not fail to do everything that was possible to show to their friends and to the rest of the world how far removed we were from the Sarajevo conspirators. Thus, on the very first evening upon which it was known what Princip had done, Stojan gave orders under which the Belgrade police prohibited music, singing and every kind of amusement in public places; everything was suspended, and there was, as it were, a period of official mourning. M. Pašić expressed to the Vienna Government our regret at the loss which had befallen a great neighbouring Power and his execration at the deed itself. At the requiem in the Catholic Church in the grounds of the Austro-Hungarian Legation on 20th June/3rd July, the day upon which the murdered heir-apparent and his wife were buried in Vienna, the Government were represented by several Ministers. I myself was of the number. I wished to testify that even I, who more than any of the others might have been thought to approve of Princip's deed, was on the contrary entirely in agreement with what our Cabinet were doing. Nevertheless, both my action in going there and the short period during which we were in the church were unpleasant to me. I felt myself among enemies, who did not desire peace with us.

It may be that the root of these feelings and premonitions of mine lay in the thoughts and sentiments which had formed themselves in my mind from my earliest youth. I was all my life taught to look out for evil in everything that Austria did, no matter how or where. I was, therefore, very naturally, in all probability more sensitive to the signs which were likely to

betray her and her intentions. Consequently, both there in the church, and in every other place, there grew within me the conviction that Austria-Hungary would not be content with any kind of satisfaction, and that she would declare war upon us. She would certainly not let slip this opportunity, as she had—in the opinion of those circles with whom much of the blame for it lay—let slip the opportunity at the time of the annexation crisis (1908–1909) and of the Albanian crisis (1913).

There now befell the sudden death of Nikola Hartwig, Russian Minister to Serbia, which took place in the Austrian Legation itself. His death was a terrible blow to me, and to many another Serb also, all the more so as the late Minister and I were intimate, and as I knew how much we owed to him and how much more we might have hoped from him; but Belgrade felt itself especially hit. At first people round about the town believed that his host, Baron Giesl, had simply poisoned him, and there arose in consequence a kind of fury against the Baron and the whole Dual Monarchy. No stupidity or infamy on the part of Austria would have surprised me, but I knew that Hartwig had a very weak heart and took no care of himself, so I asked what the doctors said, and they declared that he had died a natural death. This reassured the more reasonable sections of the public, but the people in the Austro-Hungarian Legation began to be alarmed. They began to complain that demonstrations and assaults and murders were being planned against them and their citizens. Every hour they came to the Ministry to protest and to ask for protection. An attack of this kind was, for example, to be expected on the occasion of Hartwig's funeral, and we took measures to meet any eventuality. I myself, when the procession left the church for the cemetery, kept close beside Giesl, on the one hand, in order that I might by so doing discourage any assassin who might perhaps be sorry for it if I should suffer as well as the Austrian, and, on the other hand, in order to assure him that there was nothing to be afraid of. All the same, we breathed again when everything passed off without mishap, and when Austro-Hungarian lies on the subject had once more been put to shame.

Our enemies, as everybody now knows, concealed their intentions very astutely. When we heard that Kaiser Wilhelm had put out from Kiel on his usual cruise to the north (this was on 23rd June/6th July) I hesitated between two opinions: either

he was quite sincerely thinking no evil or, on the contrary, desired to deceive the world, feigning to be unaware of what was being prepared. Immediately after this, Francis Joseph himself made a move (23rd June (*sic*)/7th July) and went back to the waters at Ischl,[1] and this also might mean peace. In fact, on that same day there was held in Vienna a council of the "joint Ministers," at which the Chief of the General Staff and a representative of the Navy were also present; and Count Berchtold immediately followed the Emperor to Ischl, presumably to submit a report of the meeting. But, in order that this might not be unfavourably interpreted, a *communiqué* was issued in which it was stated that the meeting had been concerned with the preparation of the new budget, and that the Chief of the General Staff and the representative of the Navy had therefore been summoned in order to report on certain technical questions connected with the budget. The only effect upon me of such "candour" on the part of Vienna was, on the contrary, to make me more anxious than ever.

To speak frankly, it is still a marvel to me that serious statesmen of the great friendly Powers could at that time have been so deceived. Sazonov took the whole thing very lightly. Spalajković reported to us on the 5th/18th July: "A few days ago M. Sazonov said to me that he was surprised that the Austro-Hungarian Government had taken no steps to prevent this *sterile* activity on the part of the Vienna Press, *which in the long run does no good to anybody* and does harm to Austria-Hungary herself." One by one, he allowed the Imperial Ambassadors in Vienna, Paris and Berlin to proceed on leave of absence, and he left Hartwig's post unfilled. The French Government in the same way still kept de Kock, a very sick man, as her representative here. The President of the Republic, Poincaré, made preparations for his visit to the Czar of Russia, and at midnight on the 2nd/15th July set out tranquilly from Paris for Petrograd. In the same way, all our friends advised us to remain self-possessed and cool, and to moderate our Press; and naturally no one gave us any warning to be on the alert and to prepare.

This was a success for the astute Austrian Government, which now at the beginning of July (old style), in contrast to the menacing attitude which it had hitherto adopted, assumed the part of one who harboured no evil designs. The Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff went on leave. At the

[1] He had already begun his annual cure there, but had interrupted it to attend the funeral of the Heir-Apparent.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs they so successfully reassured the Russian Ambassador, Shebeko, that he also went off somewhere for a holiday.

At that time Europe was indeed deaf and blind, and I had a feeling that from *Vidov Dan* right up to the delivery of the famous ultimatum, "Europe," as they say, "did not exist." The great Powers, Russia, France, England and Italy, to whom, it is true, there was no immediate threat of war, took no serious step to prevent that Austro-Hungarian *démarche* in Belgrade, and in fact never had any idea that it was necessary to take any step at all. To-day it is perfectly clear that the War might have been prevented if only England had declared herself in good time, and in no uncertain terms, against the projects of our enemies; and if she had threatened Berlin that she would defend France, the ally of Russia, by force of arms. This she did not do, because she would not realise the meaning of the Serbian question and the consequence for the whole world to which it would give birth.

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This attitude of England had an unfortunate effect upon the rest of the diplomatic world, and also contributed to the fact that even our Ministers abroad quite failed to foresee what was likely to come to pass. Judging from our Blue Book, issued a little later at Nish, all of them except perhaps our Minister in Vienna, M. Joca Jovanović, seem in general to have written very rarely. On the 4th/17th July M. Mata Bošković, writing from London, discreetly mentions for the first time the possibility of war: "The calculated pacific declarations in Austro-Hungarian quarters must not be trusted, because they are contemplating pressure upon Serbia, which may in the end become an armed attack." This one single remark, naturally, could not shake the conviction of my colleagues, who still thought that everything could be settled by some diplomatic arrangement. Similar confidence in a peaceful solution of the then existing state of tension was also apparent in the Belgrade Press, and our public took its cue from the Press. Everybody went to work and behaved as though everything would still go on as usual. They did business with Austro-Hungarian citizens, and travelled to the Monarchy as to a friendly country bound to us by treaty. Many people went to various Austro-Hungarian health resorts. It is sufficient to recall that Marshal Radomir Putnik himself left for Gleichenberg.

Even M. Pašić arranged to leave Belgrade for a few days, and wrote a lengthy circular to be sent out to Legations abroad

before his departure. In this circular he justified Serbia and the Serbian Government against the Austro-Hungarian accusations, declaring his complete readiness to go to meet the neighbouring Monarchy. And in order, no doubt, that our friends might take action in Vienna with a view to moderating the conditions which were to be imposed upon us, he added : " Nevertheless, we shall never be able to accept demands directed against the national dignity of Serbia, and such as could be accepted by no State that respects and preserves its own independence." These declarations were to be communicated by our Ministers to the friendly Governments, with the request that each of them would act in a conciliatory spirit " should occasion or necessity arise."

Calculating, therefore, that our friends would have time to await a proper occasion for their action, M. Pašić despatched the circular on the 6th/19th July, and on the 9th/22nd laid before the Crown Prince, who was already exercising the royal authority, a decree appointing Paču to act for him as President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Pašić set out the same day for Nish with M. Milan Šajinović, the head of the Political Department, to confer with political representatives, intending to go on afterwards to Salonica. The elections were in full blast; the nomination of candidates was complete; the lists had been deposited with the tribunals. I had given M. M. D—— my written acceptance of the leadership of the Radical list in the constituency of Vranje. In addition to the President of the Council, two of our colleagues, M. Joca Jovanović and M. Velizar Janković, were electioneering. In Belgrade there remained Paču, Stojan, M. Marko Djuričić, Colonel Dušan Stevanović and myself. Stojan had about that time taken some skin off one of his feet through wearing a tight shoe, and was unable to move out of his house.

Our Legations preserved a dead silence. They had received M. Pašić's circular and were no doubt acting on it, although we in Belgrade had so far received no report about it from any of them. It is clear to-day from published foreign documents that M. Milutin Jovanović in Berlin, M. Mata Bošković in London, M. Joca Jovanović in Vienna, and no doubt M. Vesnić also in Paris, acted on the instructions of the circular. But these and perhaps other telegrams from our Legations must have been held up *en route* somewhere by the Austrians, and so they are not to be found in our Blue Book. That collection contains, for the period between the 9th/22nd and the evening of the 10th/23rd,

only one single despatch and no more, written in Vienna on the 7th/20th July.

This despatch from M. Joca Jovanović was entirely different in content and tone from all the others he had previously written. In it open reference was made to Austro-Hungarian military preparations, to the probability that they would declare war upon us, and to the unfounded optimism with which the situation was regarded in Belgrade. On what date the despatch arrived in Belgrade, and what in general happened to it, I do not know; I do not remember that it was communicated to Ministers. In any case, even if it were, it was all too late. Our Hannibal was already before the gates.

On the morning of the 10th/23rd July I heard from an official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Baron Giesl had asked that Paču, as the Minister acting for M. Pašić, should receive him at four o'clock in the afternoon; but that Paču had said that he could not receive him at that hour, but would see him at six.

We foresaw that the expected Note was now to be delivered. We received confirmation of this from several Legations in Belgrade. The Austro-Hungarian action was therefore about to begin.

M. Šajinović tells me that he was then with M. Pašić at Nish, when they telephoned to them from the Ministry and reported what was happening in Belgrade. M. Pašić and Paču then had a conversation together. M. Pašić, he says, said to Paču: "You see him, instead of me," and although Paču insisted that Pašić should return immediately, the latter stood by his intention.

"We set out," says M. Šajinović, "from Nish for Salonica about nightfall, but you stopped us at Leskovac. There the head of the Political Section, Slavko Grujic, gave us over the telephone in French the purport of the principal demands, and I then gave orders for our carriage to be detached to await the Salonica train, in order to return to Belgrade."

That afternoon I came to the "sitting" (the name given by the messengers at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the room in which the meetings of the Council of Ministers were held), and there, together with M. Djuričić, I waited for Paču, to hear what Giesl had brought him.

Paču showed us what he had received from the Baron. We read it and quickly saw that it was not an ordinary Note, but an ultimatum, to-day so well known to everybody.

Paču himself had not up till then been at all willing to admit the possibility of such a thing, because he had believed that Germany would never approve of a step on the part of Austria-Hungary which might drag her also into war and compromise her brilliant economic progress. But now he quickly saw the gravity of the Austro-Hungarian demands, and the whole fatal meaning of her action; and, as he was very susceptible to impressions and brusque in manner, he quickly reacted. That same evening he sent a circular telegram to all our Legations, in which he told them about the Note and at the same time gave it as his opinion that the " demands imposed upon us were such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety." By these words he desired to emphasise that any Government which might be formed for that special purpose, and which should do so, would not be a *Serbian* Government.

As for myself, I was immediately certain that, notwithstanding all the intentions of my colleagues to satisfy Austria-Hungary this time, matters would nevertheless turn out as we feared. Even if we or some other Government accepted to the letter everything that the ultimatum demanded, I was convinced that the dispute would not be settled, for the execution of the obligations which we should have undertaken on behalf of Serbia would have given innumerable occasions for new complications, which would in the end have had to be settled by war. But, as I had long since been reconciled to the inevitability of what had begun to come to pass, I was now fairly cool. I saw clearly and I felt very deeply that there was nothing left for us all but bravely to meet our destiny. And among my colleagues and all other persons who on that evening and on the next day heard of the Austro-Hungarian step and immediately saw the true seriousness of it, I saw no one who showed fear, and still less, panic.

In the meantime Paču telephoned to the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, M. Strandtmann, to ask him to come to the Ministry, and when he arrived he showed him what he had received. He told him what he thought our answer might be, and begged that Russia would help us; and then he went up to the Palace.

I went to see Stojan to tell him what had happened. I found him doctoring the swelling on his leg, and I described to him the contents of the Note. He saw that it was serious, but he said: " Bring it, so that I can see it and I will try to draft an answer." I returned again to the Ministry. In the Skopljanska I met M. Ljuba Davidović, who was on his way to the

Terazija to his printing works. I got out of my cab and told him that we had received a forty-eight hours' ultimatum. On his asking about the character of the demands I told him that they were such that in my own private opinion they could not be accepted. My communication did not much excite M. Davidović, but he took it seriously.

I returned to the Ministry. Paču had already returned from the Palace. He had found the Crown Prince in the vestibule at the entrance to the house, and there he showed him the Note. When the Crown Prince had read it, Paču said to him : " This is the European war."—I reported myself to Paču at the Ministry and then I too went to the Palace. . . .

My readers may perhaps reproach me, in writing this, for having gone back to my feelings of ten years ago. They may even have thought that I now regret that there came to pass that struggle which in the end brought unexpected good fortune to our people. But, as may be seen, I have simply recorded what then took place. It is true that after those difficult days, and after others still more difficult, there came days of victory and rejoicing; but, nevertheless, we ought not to forget those earlier days.

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